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Abstract 
The implementation of “good” practices of Corporate Governance (CG) allows companies’ to strengthen long-term financial 
performance, attracting more and powerful foreign investors. Due to the importance that foreign investors have in developing 
countries, such as Albania, one may assume that the implementation of CG mechanisms in such places is beneficial both for 
companies and the countries’ economy. In this sense, Albania has been struggling to find a CG model that fits under its historical, 
cultural and political landscape. This paper aims to analyze the current situation of CG practices in Albania, based on an 
application of the Delphi technique to a panel of Albanian Chief Executive Officers (CEOs). Despite the short life of Joint Stock 
Companies (JSC) in the Albanian trade market, results show that CEOs have a good level of knowledge regarding the basic 
mechanisms of CG. There is still room, however, for improvements in the implementation of these mechanisms and in the 
adoption of the internationally accepted CG best practices. 
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1. Introduction 
A “good” Corporate Governance (CG) framework should protect shareholders’ rights and ensure their equitable 
treatment, including minorities and foreign shareholders. It should also recognize rights established by law, and 
encourage active cooperation between corporations and stakeholders in creating wealth-generating economic 
conditions, jobs and sustainability of financially sound enterprises. In addition, a “good” CG framework should 
ensure that timely and accurate disclosure is made with respect to all aspects of the corporation, including its 
financial situation, performance, ownership and governance. It should also ensure the strategic guidance of 
companies, the effective monitoring of management by the board, and the board’s accountability to the company and 
respective shareholders (OECD, 2004). In this sense, it is worth noting that a 	
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challenge of CG in transition economies is to generate an environment in which shareholders and managers are 
encouraged to target long-term performance and to influence the decision-making portfolio of foreign investors. 
Based on this initial background, and through the construction of a panel of Albanian Chief Executive Officers 
(CEOs), this paper aims to analyze the current situation of CG practices in Albania.

The Delphi technique has been applied in situations where the problem under discussion cannot be resolved by 
precise analytical techniques, simply because there are no historical data or relevant information available (Ferreira 
& Monteiro Barata, 2011). Given that this is the case of CG practices in Albania, we believe that there is 
considerable scope to explore this methodological approach in this particular context. Our research involves a panel 
of joint stock companies’ (JSCs) CEOs from the most representative cities in Albania, and it is focused on five CG 
dimensions: (1) shareholders’ rights; (2) stakeholders’ (other than shareholders) rights; (3) transparency and 
disclosure; (4) supervisory board’s role; and (5) law enforcement. To the best of our knowledge, there is no prior 
research using the Delphi technique to analyze the level of knowledge and implementation of CG mechanisms in 
Albania.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section presents the literature review highlighting 
the prominent role of CG. Section three discusses the most relevant benefits and limitations of CG practices. Section 
four presents a brief methodological background of the Delphi technique and justifies its application in the context of 
the present study. Section five presents the results of our study; and section six concludes the paper. 
 
Nomenclature 
CEE Central and East Europe 
CEO Chief Executive Officer 
CG Corporate Governance  
CIPE Canter for International Private Enterprise 
JSC Joint Stock Companies 
IFC International Finance Corporation 
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
 
2. Literature review on the prominent role of CG  
CG is becoming popular even in small economies. The concept has been spreading worldwide, and the debate 
and interest around its definition have been increasing over the years, despite its recency: “while the term 
‘Corporate Governance’ had not yet been coined 25 years ago, it has since become common in the modern business 
lexicon, used by academics, practitioners, and the popular press [...]” (Denis, 2001). The contributions from the 
economic literature notwithstanding, the concept of CG remains arguably poorly defined, mainly because it can 
potentially cover a large number of distinct economic phenomena. This has resulted in different authors having 
come up with different definitions, each reflective of their own particular interest in the field. According to Yuksel 
(2008), this is unlikely to change in the near future, such that the best way to define the concept might be to simply 
list a few different definitions, rather than just sticking to a single one. In broad terms, the OECD (2004) presents 
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CG as “the involvement of a set of relationships between a company’s management, its board, its shareholders and 
other stakeholders. Corporate Governance also provides the structure through which the objectives of the company 
are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance are determined [...]”. Shleifer & 
Vishny (1997) point out that CG deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations ensure they 
obtain the returns to their investment. Mallin (2007) defends that CG is seen as an essential mechanism in helping 
the company to attain its objectives, and that monitoring performance is a key element in this process. Thus, CG 
appears to be related to both shareholders and internal aspects of the company, such as control; and to external 
aspects, such as an organization’s relationship with its shareholders and other stakeholders. However, it is widely 
recognized that CG practices have no standard mode – there is no ‘one size fit all’ (OECD, 2002; IFC, 2004) – so 
they cannot be equally applied to all situations and jurisdictions.  
Instituting CG practices is not only a means of survival in today’s world; it is a strategy to prosper (CIPE, 2002). 
The efficiency with which capital is invested in order to produce goods and services is crucial for the well being of 
an economy (Denis, 2001). Generally, effective CG promotes a more efficient use of resources within the firm and 
in the economy, and so assists firms (and economies) to attract low-cost investment capital by increasing domestic 
and international investor confidence (for further developments on the prominent role of CG, see Becht et al., 2005; 
Rajagopalan & Zhang, 2008; Ammann et al., 2011). CG practices can thus play a crucial role in companies’ 
development and possible internationalization.  
Within this scenario, then, CG can be analyzed at the firm level (i.e. with regard to internal mechanism) or at the 
country level (i.e. structure of capital, product and labor markets, political and economic institutions, laws, 
regulation, history and culture). In fact, globalization and lack of resources force companies to look for opportunities 
in countries other than their own, in order to create value for their shareholders, and reduce risk by creating a 
diversified portfolio. This assumption works for firms operating in developed countries, emerging economies, as 
well as for firms that operate in transition countries. Furthermore, the mixed empirical findings on the effect of 
single control mechanisms on firm performance and firm value notwithstanding, corporate finance researchers 
acknowledge that better-governed firms affect portfolio decision and attract greater foreign ownership (Bae & 
Goyal, 2010). CG safeguards against corruption and mismanagement, while promoting fundamental market values 
in democratic societies. As such, it seems plausible to assume that CG is going to be important not only in 
developed markets, but potentially even more in developing countries such as Albania. 
3. Benefits and limitations of CG practices in Albania 
The urgent need for CG in Albania, as in other Central and East Europe (CEE) countries, is related to trade 
liberalization and the privatization of former state-owned companies (the effects of state versus private ownership 
on performance are reported in Claessens & Djankov, 1999; Denis & McConnell, 2003). Firms in transitional 
economies such as Albania, in which the post privatization process, as well as political and cultural features, 
contributed to the establishment of a distinct concentrated CG system, have an urgent need to reassess their CG 
standards. From this standpoint, Omran (2009), Babić (2010) and Okpara (2011) show that the importance of a 
sound CG system for transition and developing economies and post-privatized firms can be explained through five 
main lines of influences: (1) the creation of key institutions, private corporations, which drives the successful 
economic transformation to a market-based economy; (2) the effective allocation of capital and the development of 
financial markets; (3) managerial excellence, which helps firms with a weak CG structure raise capital and attract 
foreign investors; (4) the contribution to the process of national development (i.e. corporations and associated 
institutions are the key to successful economic transformation towards a market economy); and (5) the positive 
effect on firm performance and efficiency, even in periods of economic crises. “Good” CG in big companies may be 
a guiding force for mid and small companies to devise effective governance frameworks that will result in further 
strengthening of the governance environment. Following this, stakeholders and society in general will be the biggest 
beneficiaries of CG outcomes. Nevertheless, despite these general benefits and the potential implications of 
implementing CG mechanisms, there has been very little research on CG in Albania (research in this area in other 
CEE countries notwithstanding); and as such there is a lack of knowledge and appreciation of the role that CG can 
have on firm performance. The key issues here are: (1) among CEE countries, Albania has the shortest history as a 
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market oriented economy, and is therefore faced with underdeveloped institutional infrastructure and economic 
uncertainties; (2) absence of powerful investor groups, related with the absence of equity market and property rights 
institutions; (3) the absence of guidelines and codes of practices required by investors, which means the key 
references for corporate governance are the minimum standards required by law (with the Albanian CG manual 
having been approved only in December 2011); (4) weak corporate culture and lack of qualified specialists in CG 
and managerial labor markets; (5) privatization (and restructuring process) has been slower than in other transition 
economies (Lati & Sallaku, 2002); and (6) frequent government intervention. Following this, implementing best 
practices of CG still represents a challenge for Albanian JSCs. The next section presents the background of the 
Delphi technique, which is important to understand how the application of this technique can assist in analyzing the 
current situation of the corporate governance practices in Albania. 
4. The Delphi technique 
The ‘Delphi Project’ was the name given, in the early 1950s, to a USA Air Force-sponsored RAND Corporation 
research concerning the use of experts’ knowledge within their domain of expertise. The technique is often referred 
to more as an art than a science (Linstone & Turoff, 2002; Yousuf, 2007; Ferreira & Monteiro Barata, 2011). The 
basic steps of the Delphi process are outlined in Figure 1. 
 
Source: Zapata in Ferreira (2003, adap.). 
 
Fig. 1. Operational structure of the Delphi technique 
 
The essence of the technique begins with the development of an individual survey, which should be completed by 
a number of individuals considered experts (immersed and imbedded, as argued by Hsu & Sandford, 2007) on a 
specific issue under analysis (Ferreira et al., 2013), and continues by a repeated sequence of successive individual 
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questions (by interview or questionnaire) supplemented with information and advice (Dalkey & Helmer, 1963; 
Ferreira & Monteiro Barata, 2011). The aim is to achieve a convergence of opinions on a specific real-world issue 
(Hsu & Sandford, 2007). As argued by Dalkey & Helmer (1963) the object of Delphi is to “obtain the most reliable 
consensus of opinion of a group of experts [...] by a series of intensive questionnaires interspersed with controlled 
opinion feedback […]”. The Delphi technique is based on three basic principles: (1) anonymity; (2) controlled 
feedback of the information and knowledge contributions; and (3) statistical treatment of the group responses. As 
previously mentioned, the method is mainly used when the problem under discussion cannot be resolved by precise 
analytical techniques, simply because there are no historical data or relevant information about the problem, as in 
the case of corporate governance practices in Albania. As such, the problem resolution benefits from subjective 
judgments on a collective basis (Ferreira et al., 2013). From a methodological perspective, a questionnaire survey 
was developed to define the current level of corporate governance practices used by Albanian JSCs. The results of 
our study are presented in the next section.  
5. Results analysis 
Given current conditions in Albania, an extra effort was made to increase the validity of this study (i.e. in a small 
country, one cannot expect to find many experts in the field). In this sense, CEOs of 80 JSCs were selected. The 
selection was based on official commercial data and through discussions with specialists. The survey was conducted 
mainly in the cities of Tirana, Durrës, Fier, Vlorë (where the greatest number of Albanian JSCs is concentrated), but 
also in Shkodra, Tropoja, Elbasan, Gjirokastër, Lushnje and Saranda. After the first round, the number of panel 
members decreased to 53 and, after the second round, only 37 panelists responded to the survey. It should be 
underlined, however, that “there is no ideal number of experts for the application of the Delphi technique” (Ferreira 
& Monteiro Barata, 2011). 
5.1. Sample characterization 
Considering the purpose of the study, it was decided to include experts from different types of JSCs (i.e. banking, 
insurance and other financial services). Also, some of them represent private JSC, while others stand for state-
owned JSCs (established as such from the beginning or generated from special laws). Table 1 shows that most of the 
companies are owned by a single shareholder (40.6%) or a small group of controlling shareholders (i.e. 4-8). This 
evidence is in accordance with the data of IFC (2004) and Llaci & Tabaku (2010). 
Table 1. Ownership structure 
 Number % 
Shareholders 
1 
2 
3 
4-8 
More than 100 
40.6 
18.9 
5.4 
27.0 
8.1 
Total N=37 100.0 
 
A characterization of the sample (i.e. 37 respondents of the 2
nd round) is provided in Table 2, which shows that 
most respondents are male (70.3%), and between 43-47 years old (40.6%). As far as qualifications are concerned, 
most of the panel members hold a higher academic degree (67.6%), predominantly in economics or management 
(67.6%). 
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Table 2. Characterization of the respondents [second round] 
Delphi Panel 
 N %
Gender 
Female 11 29.7
Male 26 70.3
Total 37 100.0
Year of Birth 
1952–1956 3 8.1
1957–1960 3 8.1
1961–1965 8 21.6
1966–1970 15 40.6
1971–1976 8 21.6
Total 37 100.0
Qualifications 
4-Year diploma 12 32.4
MSc, MBA 20 54.1
Ph.D. 5 13.5
Other 0 0.00
Total 37 100.0
Area 
Economics/Management 25 67.6
Engineering 8 21.6
Other 4 10.8
Total 37 100.0
 
The data obtained according to the structure of the questionnaire are presented in the next subsection. 
5.2. General characterization of the present situation 
The objective of this section is to determine the level of acknowledgement of CG mechanisms and their benefits 
in Albanian JSCs. Based on the data collected from the panel of experts, we tried to understand their opinions about 
the real benefits of CG mechanisms. Based on a Likert scale from 1 to 5 (1 = strongly agree; 2 = agree; 3 = neither 
agree nor disagree; 4 = disagree; 5 = strongly disagree), and as shown in Table 3, the respondents elected 
consistency with laws and regulations; improvement in the access to capital markets; increase of the level of 
oversight and accountability; reduction of costs of capital, fraud and corruption; and reduction of the risk of 
uncertainty for foreign investors as some of the most important benefits brought by the use of CG mechanisms.  
  Table 3. Benefits of CG mechanisms 
Benefits Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
Coefficient 
of Variation 
Consistency with laws and regulations 1.27 1.00 0.508 0.400 
Improves the access to capital markets 1.57 1.00 0.647 0.412 
Increases the ability to swift and take effective decisions 1.57 2.00 0.603 0.351 
Increases the assets company value 1.73 2.00 0.608 0.422 
Increases the level of oversight and accountability 1.54 1.00 0.650 0.389 
It helps to establish a good reputation 1.70 2.00 0.661 0.445 
Minimizes the risk of personal responsibility 1.68 2.00 0.669 0.398 
Possibility of new partnerships with outside entities 1.73 2.00 0.769 0.445 
Reduces costs of capital, fraud and corruption 1.51 1.00 0.559 0.370 
Reduces the risk of uncertainty for foreign investors 1.43 1.00 0.502 0.351 
 
847 Amali Çipi et al. /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  110 ( 2014 )  841 – 851 
Respondents were next asked to rank the three CG mechanisms that most affect firm performance (i.e. 1 = most 
important; 3 = third most important). Table 4 presents the aggregated scores, which resulted from giving 3 points to 
the most important criterion, 2 points to the one considered in second, and 1 point to the one identified as third most 
important.  
Table 4. Benefits provided by the implementation of CG mechanisms [n=37] 
 Points 
CEO’s power over the supervisory/administrative board 48 
CEO’s reward 11 
Composition and size of the supervisory/administrative board 35 
Degree of ownership concentration 23 
Implementation of corporate social responsibility practices 1 
Number of independent members in the supervisory/administrative board 13 
Quality of company’s regulations 39 
Stronger shareholders’ rights 40 
Taking into consideration the rights of the other stakeholders 5 
Transparency and disclosure of the company’s information 8 
Other 0 
Total 223 
 
The final ranking was the following: (1) CEO’s power over the supervisory/administrative board (with 48 
points); (2) stronger shareholders’ right (40 points); and (3) quality of company’s regulations (39 points). The next 
subsection analyses the respondents’ answers regarding shareholders’ rights. It is interesting to note that Corporate 
Social Responsibility, other stakeholders’ rights and transparency issues were given almost null importance so far 
as CG benefits go, possibly indicating a relative lack of relative importance attributed to such issues.  
5.3. Shareholders’ and (other) stakeholders’ rights 
This part of the survey sought to analyze the level of implementation of shareholders’ rights. Based on a Likert 
scale ranging from 1 to 5 (1 = bad; 2 = somewhat; 3 = moderate; 4 = sufficient; 5 = good), Table 5 shows that there 
is a good level of shareholders’ rights implementation in terms of ownership right over the share, the right to 
information and the right to take dividends. Other rights, such as participation in the decision-making and control 
processes and the right to appeal were classified as sufficiently implemented. 
 Table 5. Level of implementation of shareholders’ rights 
Shareholders’ rights Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
Coefficient 
of Variation 
Ownership right over the share 4.32 5.00 1.002 0.232 
Participation in the decision-making and control processes 4.22 4.00 1.004 0.238 
Right to appeal 3.73 4.00 1.146 0.307 
Right to information 4.30 5.00 0.968 0.225 
Right to take dividends 4.35 5.00 1.006 0.231 
 
With regard to the shareholders’ access to information, the panelists responded as shown in Table 6. 
Based on Table 6, shareholders are able to consult a broad variety of documents produced by the company. More 
specifically, the financial balance (22.14%), annual reports (19.85%), periodic data on the outcomes of the 
company (18.32%), the list of members of the supervisory board (16.79%), information on the executive director 
and key managers and list of shareholders (both with 11.45%). It is worth noting, however, that this finding should 
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be seen in accordance with the specific legislation that regulates the activity of this group of companies in Albania, 
which imposes legal requirements to inform the shareholders. 
Table 6. Shareholders’ access to information [n=37] 
 Documents % 
Company’s information that can be used 
freely by shareholders 
Annual reports 19.85 
Financial balance 22.14 
Information on the executive director and key managers 11.45 
List of shareholders 11.45 
List of members of the supervisory board 16.79 
Periodic data on the outcomes of the company 18.32 
 Total 100.00 
 
The next question aimed to analyze the companies’ recognition of other stakeholders’ rights, based on a Likert 
scale ranging from 1 to 5 (1 = inadequate level; 2 = somewhat; 3 = intermediate level; 4 = good; 5 = very good). In 
general, the panel members considered their recognition of the rights of those (other) stakeholders to be Good 
(Table 7). This is an interesting result, in particular given the apparent lack of importance attributed to these other 
stakeholders in terms of CG benefits mentioned before. 
Table 7. Level of recognition of other stakeholders of the company 
Other stakeholders Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
Coefficient 
of variation 
Creditors 4.22 4.00 0.821 0.195 
Employees 4.22 4.00 0.917 0.217 
Local community 3.86 4.00 1.004 0.260 
Suppliers 4.27 4.00 0.769 0.180 
5.4. Degree of transparency and disclosure of the information 
The next question aimed to determine the level of transparency and disclosure revealed by Albanian JSCs. Based 
on a Likert scale from 1 to 5 (1 = not important; 3 = moderately important; 5 = decisively important), respondents 
were asked to express how important is the publication of certain business documents. Table 8 presents the results. 
Table 8. Publications considered important from a strategic perspective 
Documents Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
Coefficient 
of Variation 
Annual report 4.46 5.00 0.869 0.195 
CEO’s and other employees’ remuneration 2.59 3.00 1.301 0.502 
Company policies regarding its business 4.11 4.00 0.809 0.197 
Company statutes 3.41 3.00 1.301 0.382 
Financial balance sheets 4.32 5.00 0.915 0.212 
Information about the supervisory board members and executive director 3.43 3.00 1.068 0.311 
Information on the audit conducted by the company 3.97 4.00 1.190 0.300 
Information on the share transactions 3.62 4.00 1.421 0.393 
Organizational chart of the company 4.08 4.00 1.038 0.254 
Quarterly reports 3.70 4.00 1.222 0.330 
Supervisory board’s member remuneration 2.38 2.00 1.139 0.479 
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According to the respondents, the publication of the annual report and financial balance sheets are seen as very 
important (median score of 5), followed by company policies regarding the business, information on company 
audits, information on the share transactions, the company’s organizational chart, and quarterly reports (all with 
median scores of 4). The remaining items assumed moderate importance (i.e. CEO’s and other employees’ 
remuneration, company statutes, and information about the supervisory board members and executive director). 
5.5. Role and responsibilities of the supervisory/administrative board 
Through the next question, we attempted to provide general information about the companies’ supervisory and 
administrative dimension. Table 9 provides a general overview of the results.  
Table 9. Dimension and composition of the supervisory/administrative board [n=37] 
 
Number % 
Number of members of the 
supervisory/administrative board 
3-5 62.2 
6 21.6 
7–15 16.2 
Total 100.0 
 
As can be seen, administrative boards have a relatively small number of members in their composition. In 
particular, 62.2% of the panel members indicated their company boards have 3-5 members; 28% indicated 6 
members; and the reminder 16.2% indicated that the board has from 7 to 15 members in its composition. 
Grounded on a Likert scale ranging from 1 to 3 (1 = limited or no understanding; 3 = complete understanding), 
the next question shed light on the board’s level of understanding of some important business issues (Table 10). 
Table 10. Board’s level of understanding of some important business issues 
Issues Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
Coefficient of 
Variation 
Company’s current strategy 2.73 3.00 0.450 0.165 
Company’s financial position 2.78 3.00 0.479 0.172 
Dynamics of the company’s industry 2.43 3.00 0.603 0.249 
Risks faced by the company 2.46 3.00 0.650 0.264 
Value created by the company 2.57 3.00 0.603 0.235 
 
As shown in Table 10, the respondents revealed a complete level of recognition of some important business 
issues (all median scores are 3.00). 
5.6. Law obligation and implementation 
The objective of this section was to obtain important information in terms of law enforcement issues (Table 11).  
Table 11. Capacity of regulatory institutions to implement legislation [n=37] 
Evaluation % 
Completely inappropriate 0.0 
Low 13.6 
Good 67.5 
Very good 18.9 
Total 100.0 
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Based on the data presented in Table 11, we can easily see that although some panelists classified the role of 
regulatory institutions in the implementation of the legislation as very good (18.9%) or low (13.6%), most of the 
respondents consider this role to be somewhere in between (67.5%). There were no negative evaluations, and the 
distribution of responses regarding the evaluation of the court proceedings in which the company may have been 
involved is consistent with this result (Table 12). 
Table 12. Evaluation of the court proceedings in which the company was involved [n=37] 
Evaluation (%) 
Costly 25.9 
Effective 3.7 
Less than appropriate 14.8 
Too long 51.9 
With significant impact 3.7 
Total 100.0 
 
The results presented in Table 12 indicate that the respondents considered the court proceeding to be too long 
(51.9% of cases), costly (25.9% of cases) and less than appropriate (14.8% of cases). Only few of them consider 
those procedures as effective (3.7%) and with significant impact (3.7%). 
6. Discussion and final remarks 
CG is becoming popular even in small economies. Improving CG implementation is considered fundamental to 
ensure macroeconomic benefits, namely in terms of trade liberalization and privatization of former state-owned 
companies. CG is also seen as an important factor in attracting foreign investment, considered crucial for economic 
development. For transition economies such as Albania, it is important to choose CG practices that fit well under the 
respective legislation, history and culture. As such, our study aimed to understand the current state of CG practices 
implementation in Albanian JSCs. Given this main objective, we explored the application of the Delphi technique in 
this particular context. For that purpose, a panel of Albanian CEOs was asked to evaluate the current state of CG 
implementation in the country. As previously stated, we know of no prior work using the Delphi technique to 
analyze the current state of implementation of CG mechanisms in this country. 
The analysis of our results shows that the panel’s overall assessment of CG knowledge is considered good, but its 
actual implementation in Albanian JSCs is not at the same level. More specifically, the survey shows that, in 
general, the recognition of shareholders’ basic rights (e.g. the right to participate in general meetings, the right to be 
informed on the company’s strategic issues, the right to obtain dividends) is at relatively good level. In addition, the 
panel members revealed a good knowledge about the rights of other stakeholders, such as employees, creditors and 
suppliers, however, did not consider these other stakeholders, or crucially Corporate Social Responsibility as an 
important positive result of CG application. Furthermore, it should be noted that this issue was treated based on 
Albanian legislation, rather than international standards and practices, because the statutes and other regulation of 
Albanian JSCs are typically grounded on Albanian legislation.  
Our results can be associated to a concentrated ownership structure, and the prevailing view is that the 
implementation of the shareholders’ rights is in line with the recognition of these rights. Nevertheless, there is room 
for improvements and there is need for better awareness of other stakeholders and the role they can play in 
improving governance; as well as the impact they can have in strengthening the company transparency. Indeed, 
transparency and disclosure of information were two elements still far below expected levels. Although there has 
been significant progress towards increasing the information produced and published by JSCs, it is important to note 
that it is still difficult to assess the quality and price information reflected in investors’ behavior. As such, there is a 
generalized opinion that JSCs should prepare their financial statements in accordance with international financial 
reporting standards. 
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Despite the progress achieved, there is still more to be done. Legislation will help Albanian JSCs to move faster 
towards a free market economy and to attract powerful investors outside the region. Furthermore, the need for 
Albania to be part of the European Union will be a good incentive to adopt and improve international practices.  
There are several potentially fruitful research opportunities on CG in Albanian firms. In particular, a deeper 
understanding of the historical evolution of CG, laws and regulations, and the context-specific challenges and 
opportunities in the country, will allow researchers to identify further research questions and to develop research 
models that are more sensitive to the Albanian context. Such deeper understanding can also help practitioners, both 
local and foreign, in combining Western expertise and local knowledge and improving governance in this promising 
yet challenging economy (Rajagopalan & Zhang, 2008). Highlighting the Albanian situation can be the basis of a 
comparison between ex-socialist countries in the region, and will help us to understand the peculiar transformations 
that managers are facing in this dynamic and complex environment. 
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